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1 
 Cognitive Computation of Compressed Sensing for Watermark 
Signal Measurement 
 
Huimin Zhao and Jinchang Ren 
 
Abstract²As an important tool for protecting multimedia contents, scrambling and randomizing of original messages is used in 
generating digital watermark for satisfying security requirements. Based on the neural perception of high-dimensional data, compressed 
sensing (CS) is proposed as a new technique in watermarking for improved security and reduced computational complexity. In our 
proposed methodology, watermark signal is extracted from the CS of the Hadamard measurement matrix. Through construction of the 
scramble block Hadamard matrix utilizing a cryptographic key, encrypting the watermark signal in CS domain is achieved without any 
additional computation required. The extensive experiments have shown that the neural inspired CS mechanism can generate watermark 
signal of higher security, yet it still maintains a better trade-off between in transparency and robustness. 
 
Index Terms² Cognitive computation; digital watermark; compressive sensing (CS); measurement matrix; discrete cosine transform 
(DCT); scrambled block Hadamard matrix (SBHM). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Digital watermark is an important secret communication technology being developed for multimedia services, where the owner, for 
retrieval only by those authorized, embeds significant amounts of hidden data into a host data source. The hidden data should be 
recoverable even after the host has undergone standard transformations, such as compression and noise [1], [2]. For satisfying the 
security requirements, conventional approaches need have the watermark signal scrambled and randomized before embedding them 
into the host data source. In [3], J. Cox et al. showed a basic implementation in frequency domain, in which a watermark signal 
consists of a spread spectrum (SS) sequence of real numbers nxxX ,,1  , and each value ix is constructed from independent, 
identically distributed (I.I.D.) samples drawn from a Gaussian distribution. To increase the security of the watermark signal, 
G.Voyatzis et al. [4] proposed a type of watermark signal construction method based on chaotic system and cryptography principles 
in the spatial domain. Let X, W and K be three sets, representing digital product to be protected, the watermark signal, and secret 
keys, respectively, the watermark algorithm G can be defined as follows in [4]: 
WKXWTWKRRTG ouuo :,:,          (1) 
Here, R is controlled by a pseudo random generator, and K maps directly to a type of seed of the pseudo random generator, such 
as Logistic mapping. While R is regarded as a chaotic system, K is formed by certain transforms with many initial conditions. Under 
these conditions, the set of K needs to be large enough, and satisfy a uniqueness condition as requested by the watermark signal. Fig. 
1 shows a general process how the image watermark signal is generated. 
As seen in Fig.1, in conventional scheme, for the generation of the image watermark signal, the original watermark image must 
be firstly sampled by using some complete transformations, such as Fourier Transform (FT), discrete cosine transform (DCT), 
discrete wavelet transform (DWT), and singular value decomposition (SVD) [5]. One interesting approach introduced in [6] applies 
DFT on predefined disks rather than image blocks, where the disk centers are determined as the feature points using scale invariant 
feature transform (SIFT). However, block based transform is widely used for its easy implementation.   
Afterwards, all coefficients of the transformed image need be scrambled and encrypted, using approaches such as the Arnold and 
Fibonacci Q method [1]. As the original watermark image needs to be sampled and scrambled by a convolution form of some matrix 
in a nonlinear way, a high degree of data redundancy can be identified in the transformed watermark signal [7]. On one hand, this 
increases the capacity of the embedded watermark signal. On the other hand, the additional hidden information (watermark) to be 
embedded may become difficult or even impossible to be extracted due to the distortion of the transform domain coefficients [8]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1. Comparison of conventional watermark scheme and our proposed one in the CS-domain. 
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When the dimensionality of the data increases, the task to model and identify statistical relationships between the data patterns 
becomes significantly difficult, and this phenomenon is called the curse of dimensionality [9]. To address this challenge, 
compressed sensing theory (CS) is proposed recently as it helps to achieve centripetal sensing and compression of sparse signals. 
Due to a simple linear measurement step used, it is found that CS is particularly useful in simulating the neural perception 
mechanism of our human brains in effectively dealing with multidimensional data [11-12]. As shown in Fig. 2, the vision system of 
our brain actually contains a multi-stage compressed sensing mechanism. The first stage is from object to optic nerve, where the data 
rate has been reduced from 10
9
 to 10
7
 bits per second (bps) [13-14]. In the next stage of compressed sensing, the date rate has been 
further reduced to 10
2
 bps when it reaches the visual cortex yet still maintains the essential information. This has demonstrated the 
efficacy of sparse coding networks in CS in maximizing the coding efficiency [11, 15, 16]. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. How compressed sensing (CS) has been embedded in our brain when vision perception is achieved.  
 
By applying CS to watermark, it has provided the best trade-off between the security and robustness of watermark signal 
[17-19]. Orsdemir et al [17] found that CS measurement matrix had pseudo-random entries, and could be achieved by using a 
cryptographic key shared between the sender and receiver. In [19], Lu et al proposed a secure image retrieval system through 
random projection in CS domain. As shown in [20] and [21], many signal processing algorithms performed in the CS domain had 
very close performance as those in the original domain. Based on the measurement matrix of CS, Zhao et al. [22] proposed an image 
semi-fragile watermarking algorithm, in which the measurement values of the CS were registered as the zero-watermark signal and 
used to recover the tampered image with the watermark signal. In [23], Zhang et al proposed a novel watermarking scheme, using a 
CS technique to retrieve the coefficients by exploiting the sparseness in the DCT domain. In [24], Wang and Zeng et al. proposed a 
scheme of integrated secure watermark detection and privacy preserving storage in the CS domain, in which multimedia data and the 
watermark signal were presented to the cloud for secure watermark detection in a CS domain to protect the privacy. In our previous 
work [25], based on the CS theory, a spatial domain approach with a deterministic measurement matrix was presented for 
watermarking generation and intraframe tampering detection. However, in this paper we have introduced CS domain Hadamard 
measurement matrix to cope with the sparsity level of the input signals. 
The emerging theory of CS indicates that CS-based watermark models can be used to simplify the acquisition of 
high-dimensional signals that might otherwise be difficult to collect or encode. Rather than collecting an entire ensemble of signal 
samples, CS requires only a small number of random linear measurements, with the number of measurements proportional to the 
sparsity level of the signal. As a result, signal processing or watermarking data-mining in the CS domain is feasible and 
computationally secure under certain conditions.  
Inspired by the theory of CS, a new watermark scheme is introduced in this paper. It is our aim to establish a novel secure 
information hiding system by utilizing the watermark signal measured from the CS Hadamard matrix which can express all features 
of the original watermark signal and possess itself an encryption property from random elements of the Hadamard matrix that 
encryption occurs implicitly in the sensing process-without requiring additional computation. With the proposed CS-domain 
watermark scheme, as compared in Fig. 1, our scheme has several advantages: Firstly, most of the existing watermarking scheme 
paid little attention to security of the watermark signal, while our scheme improves the security. Second, watermarking data-mining 
in the CS domain is feasible with measurement values and posses computationally better transparency under certain statistical 
conditions. Third, with watermarking data measured in received side, original watermark signal can be constructed high probability. 
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The remaining paper is organized as follows: Section II gives some related works for CS. The proposed CS-watermark scheme 
is presented in detail in Section III. Section III discusses dataset description and experimental settings. Comprehensive results and 
discussions are reported in Section IV. Finally Section V concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK FOR THE CS THEORY 
When a signal can be represented by a small number of non-zero coefficients, the CS asserts that it can be perfectly recovered 
after being transformed by a limited number of incoherent, non-adaptive linear measurements [26-28]. Let a signal fę NR  be a 
K-sparse vector, i.e. only K out of the N elements of f are nonzero. If f can be transformed to 
MRx  with fx 4  and NM  , 
4  is namely the sparse matrix. For image data 4  is usually chosen as the DCT and DWT. If 4  satisfies Restricted Isometry 
Property (RIP) [26-27], the sparse matrix can be obtained by solving the following optimization problem: 
                    fxtsf 4 ..||||min 1                                   (2) 
Actually, this process equals to finding the sparsest solutions to fx 4 , subject to )/log( KNCM Kt , where 
)1,0(/  NKCK  is a small constant which denotes the sparsity level of the input signal. The CS theory states that the sparse 
signal x can be reconstructed by using only M linear projection in a non-adaptive measurement as follows: 
                                   fxy )4 )                                               (3) 
where y is an Mh1 sampled vector, and) is an NM u  measurement matrix that is incoherent with4 , i.e., the maximum 
magnitude of the element in )4 is small. 
In fact, Eq. (2) presents an l1 minimization problem, which can be solved by using the orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm 
[28]. For Eq. (3), if the entries of the matrix )  are generated from a Gaussian distribution (zero mean and variance ı),)  is a RIP 
matrix with overwhelming probability in [26-27]. The Gaussian CS matrix suits include the seeds and a random function. 
It has been shown that it is feasible for many signal-processing algorithms to be performed in the CS domain [20-25]. In practical 
applications, an image sized of N= 21 NN u is divided generally into B×B blocks. For each block, ideally the size of the 
measurement matrix in CS domain needs be appropriately selected by considering the associated sparsity KC  . That is, assume that 
ix  is a sparse vector representing block i of the input image NMRx
M  , . The corresponding measurement sample iy  can be 
decided by  
                                    iBi xy )                                               (4) 
where the length of the signal iy  is m , and B) is a 2Bmu  measurement matrix. For each image block, the numbers of 
measurement samples can be determined as m= ¬ ¼NBM /2 , where M is size of samples needed by the CS measurement for the 
whole image. In this way, ) has a block-diagonal structure as given in (5). Therefore, the overall technique above was called block 
CS (BCS) [29]. 
                          ][ Bdiag ) )                                          (5) 
 
III. THE PROPOSED CS WATERMARK SCHEME 
In this section, detailed algorithm description is given to discuss how the proposed CS domain watermark scheme works in terms 
of signal measurement, measurement matrix construction and security analysis. 
A. The measurement of the watermark signal 
      In the proposed watermark scheme, the original watermark image is firstly divided into same-sized non-overlapping blocks, in 
which blocking criteria of the watermark image is jointly decided by the size and positioning accuracy of the watermark signal as 
requested for extraction and recovery. Next, each block of the watermark image is transformed by a sparse basis matrix in which we 
use DCT as the sparse basis Ȍ, and forms various DCT coefficients blocks. Meanwhile, measurement matrix B) is deployed to 
sense these DCT coefficients independently within each block. This process is simply a random linear projection, and can be 
achieved by inner product operation of corresponding two elements between Ȍ and B) . Here, according to the principle of the CS 
theory [26-27], selection of B) is incoherent with Ȍ. As the sparse basis Ȍ is a type of DCT matrix, we can solve the constraint by 
an appropriate measurement matrix B) . We will discuss the designing of B)  in a later subsection. Finally, the watermark signal 
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wMy  is generated by combining the sampling values from the measurement matrix B) of each image block. 
Assume the total numbers of pixels of the original gray watermark image is 
21 NNN u , in which both 1N and 2N  are 
multiples of B, denoting the number of rows and columns, respectively. We segment the watermark image into 
0K  non-overlapped 
BhB pixel blocks, and denote the pixels as ),( jixk , where 20 /1 BNKk  dd  and 1,0 dd Bji . 
For the kth image block kx , ],1[ 0Kk , its DCT results with 8 B  is denoted as kZ , whose 64 coefficients are rearranged as 
a vector kV  by using a zigzag scanning, i.e.  
T
kkkkV )]7,7(,),1䠈0(),0䠈0([ ZZZ                  (6)     
For the re-organized 64 DCT coefficients in kV , they are quantized in a non-uniform manner below to map them into integers 
within [-64, 63]. 
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where 
3006
2tt
ft   with ]63,0[t . 
Let M represent the total size of samples of the watermark signal measured in CS domain, the size of the measurement samples 
for each image block of the original watermark image is ¬ ¼0/ KMm   or ¬ ¼0/ KM . If the measurement samples of block l 
are ),...,2,1)(,䠄 0Kljiyl  , measurement samples of each block are then put together to form the watermark signal in the DCT±CS 
domain, as given by 
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     Usually, the elements of wMY  in (8) need be normalized to have ]1,0[Mw where mKM 0 . If an appropriate 
measurement matrix )  is selected corresponding to the DCT-based sparse basis Ȍ, the measurement samples of the original image 
can represent all features in DCT-CS domain. As a result, we can take the measurement samples as the watermark signal, namely the 
CS-watermark signal in this paper. In other words, the CS-watermark signal shows inherent characteristics of the watermarking 
image by measurement samples, and the size of watermark signal M is far less than N, the length of the original watermark image. 
Consequently, the basis Ȍ provides a M sparse representation of signal x (M<<N).   
B. Construction of measurement matrix 
Construction of the measurement matrix )  in (5) and (11) is the most important factor in generating the CS-watermark signal. 
Cands et al. [28] have proved that Gaussian random matrix satisfied the RIP requirement under statistical condition. However, 
storage and transmission of this kind of matrix needs huge memory requirement and high computational complexity. For other 
options of deterministic measurement matrix, we have come over polynomial matrix [25], discrete Chirp matrix and Reed-muller 
codes matrix [30]. Unfortunately, the operators of these matrixes are not universal as they are only incoherent with the identity 
matrix.  
Considering the security requirement of the information hiding with the robust CS-watermark signal, in this paper, we have 
proposed a new sampling operator called scrambled block Hadamard matrix (SBHM). In SBHM, )  employs the partial block 
Hadamard transform and randomly permute its columns, hence we have a form of )  as follows 
                                 NNMM VU u) ĭ                                            (9) 
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where the matrix NMu) is a block diagonal matrix as in (4). Actually, NMu)  represents the set of the block Hadamard matrix 
(BHM) B) , where MU  is an operator which picks up M rows of NMu)  at random, and NV denotes a scrambling operator which 
randomly records the N columns of NMu) . For satisfying the incoherent of )  DQG Ȍ ZH FRPSLOH D ZLVK-list to show the 
construction criteria of) . 
Ɣ Near optimal performance: The number of measurements for perfect reconstruction is close to the theoretic bound. 
Ɣ Universality: ) FDQEHSDLUHGZLWKDYDULHW\RIVSDUVHEDVLVPDWUL[Ȍ for natural watermark images. 
Ɣ Security: each element of )< has scrambling and random coefficient, and is asymptotically normally distributed with zero 
mean and variance of 
1N . 
Based on the criteria above, we map the elements of the BHM NMu)  in Sylvester's form using the group homomorphism 
}1{0}1-{1 u ˈˈˈˈ   as follows. Consider a rank n matrix nH  sized of nn 2u , whose columns consist of all n-bit numbers 
ascendingly arranged. Sylvester's Hadamard matrix nH  can then be recursively defined by 
                              
»¼
º«¬
ª 
 

uu 
11
2121
1
11 10
]1,0[
nn
n
HH
H
H
nn                                         (10) 
It can be inducted that the image of the Hadamard matrix above satisfies 
                                  n
T
n HHH n  2                                                 (11) 
When 
nB 2 , we can obtain a form of BHM NMu)  as  
                    > @ > @nHdiagdiag BNM 2 ) ) u                 (12) 
This construction process shows that the rows of the BHM NMu)  can be viewed as a linear error-correcting code of rank n 
(with a length 
n2 ), and the minimum distance 1-2n  with the generating matrix nH . In addition, it is obvious that small B is 
advantageous for computational and storage efficiency. The bound of B can be further improved, as B can be actually very small 
( 164424  u  B ) for image watermarking.  
 Besides, the block diagonal structure of NMu)  enables its fast and parallel measurement at a complexity )log( BNO  along 
with small memory requirement [29]. In addition, based on the combinatorial central limit theorem, we can even prove that, for the 
)  given in (9) and a sparse basis Ȍ based-DCT, let )< ) f , each element ),( jif)  is asymptotically normally distributed with 
zero mean and variance of 
1N .  
After determining NMu) , for data security purpose, each element of the matrix needs to be scrambled. The sparse input signal 
sampled from the original image kV  is pseudo-randomly permuted in a chaotic way so that )  LVLQFRKHUHQWZLWKȌEDVHG-DCT. 
However, in practice, for limited computational complexity, NV  cannot be selected as a pure random operator. Here, we will 
consider the method of linear congruential permutation (LCP) [18], which is a simple pixel level scrambler.  
For an input vector ),( vuVk , it outputs are determined as follows, where again ],1[ 0Kk  denotes the number of blocks: 
),(),( vuVn kVvuV  , 7,0 dd vu                     (13) 
64],64mod),([),䠄  AvuAvuVk                     (14) 
where A is a positive integer relative prime with N. Therefore, NV  ( ],0[ 0KN ) can be restructured by  
T
nN vuVvuVvuVV )],(),...,,(),,([ 21                   (15) 
where n  denotes the total number of re-ordered coefficients obtained from all image blocks.   
Because there is only one parameter A in (14), an LCP can be easily implemented for pixel-by-pixel scrambling. In addition, as 
MU is an operator from M rows of NNM Vu) uniform at random in (9), we can save nH , MU  and NV  as secret keys S with small 
memory requirement. This set of secret keys will further be applied to extract the CS-watermark signal at the receiver side. 
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      Based on the analysis above, with the support of CS theory, the CS-watermark signal is generated. The time complexity of the 
CS-watermark signal depends on the size of the measurement matrix) . For each DCT block of the original watermark image, the 
time complexity for feature extraction is )( 2mBO  and thus the total time complexity for the whole image is )(mNO . 
C. Security analysis of the CS-watermark signal 
In the proposed scheme, measurement of CS technique itself is an encryption that occurs implicitly in the sensing process. This 
can provide an effective security of compression and encryption for the watermark signal, where the encryption does not need any 
extra computational cost. In the encryption process, measurements matrix of CS may be regarded as a realization form of secure and 
reliable keys. In [31], Y. Rachlin et al. proved that if an attack did not have a priori knowledge of the measurement matrix, it could 
only try all possible keys by using some exhaustive algorithms. This is a NP-hard problem, which is almost impossible to be solved. 
Therefore, security of the CS-watermark signal can be decided by the encryption property of the CS measurement matrix, in which 
random elements of the measurement matrix decide the measurement values property with random noise.  
In addition, we can also show the security of the CS-watermarking from the signal detection point of view as detailed below. For 
(3), if data x is attacked by operation x'  in CS domain, we have xxx ' * . Thus, the measurement values of matrix )  will be 
changed correspondingly as    
                            yyxxxy ' )') ) **                          (16) 
It is obvious from (3) and (16), we obtain 
                                        xy )' '                                                     (17) 
As can be seen, after the original data are changed by the attack operation, the measurement difference values of CS are the 
projection y'  of x'  on the matrix) . For simplicity, assume the original data x is only changed in a pixel, that is only a nonzero 
elements in x'  
                              ]0,...,,...,0,0[ fxx ' '                                              (18) 
Then, y' modified by the measurement values of a block matrix B) becomes  
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where
BBhhh u,...,, 1211 denote each element of the Hadamard matrix. Then, the ith element in iy' can be represented as  
                                   ixfi hxy ' '                                                    (20) 
From (19) and (20), it can be clearly observed that, local modification from the original signal would cause the global 
modification by measurements matrix of CS. We use a squared Euclidean distance D as the security standard between the original 
data and the attacked one below   
¦¦¦¦
    
o ' ' '  
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i
ixfix
M
i
f
M
i
ii
M
i
i hxhxyyyD
1
222
11
22
1
)()(           (21) 
That is, the smaller fx'  is, the less D is, and the higher the security of the signal extracted becomes. Correspondingly, when 
fx'  increases, D will become larger, and the security will be rapidly reduced. In our proposed method, as the CS-watermark signal 
executes some general signal process operations (i.e., DCT, DWT, SVD, and Hadamard transform), modification of fx'  is usually 
small. Therefore, modification of D remains insignificant. If the CS-watermark signal is attacked by some unauthorized operations, 
the value fx'  of the CS-watermarked signal will be rapidly increased, the D  will be exponentially changed. Accordingly, the value 
D will also cause global distortion of measurement values in CS domain. Therefore, meaningful hidden messages are unable to be 
recovered by the attackers at the receiver side. As an information hiding result, the CS-watermark signal will be still secured in our 
proposed scheme.  
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IV. DATASETS AND EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS 
To test the security and robustness of the proposed CS-watermark scheme, we have applied the scheme for information hiding in 
videos with the experiment system shown in Fig. 3. Firstly, we take four consecutive frames as a group, and each frame within a 
group is divided into blocks. Then, according to the +XDQJ¶Valgorithm [32], the DC value of each block located in the same position 
of successive frames within a group is transformed into the DCT domain. As there are four frames in a group, the second DCT 
actually contains four elements, one DC and three AC coefficients. Afterwards, we embed the CS-watermark signal into these AC 
values by using QIM (Quantization Index Modulation) [33]. Finally, after the watermarked video streams are transmitted in noise 
channel, we can extract the watermark signal by a cryptographic key of the measurement matrix shared between the sender and 
receiver.  
      The description of the datasets and the experimental settings are discussed in detail as follows.  
A. Datasets used 
In our experiments, the original watermark image, is obtained from a real gray level fingerprint from the FVC2004 database 
(DB3) with a size 160h160 [34]. The fingerprint image is then processed by a sparse basis Ȍ based DCT. Finally, we obtain the 
CS-watermark signal of the fingerprint image by block Hadamard matrix )  combining (11) and (15). The original fingerprint 
image and the measurement samples with various sizes are illustrated in Fig. 4, where the measurement samples from CS have 
clearly shown some random properties.  
 
 (a)                  (b) 
 (c)                   (d) 
Fig. 4. Original fingerprint image (160h160) (a) and three measurement samples sized of 100h100 (b), 80h80 (c), and 80h100 (d), respectively. 
 
Three well-known video sequences, Basketball, Scene and Mobile, are used in our experiments for CS-watermark signal 
embedding. The frame size of these videos is 720h480, and each sequence contains 80 frames. For each video, one representative 
frame is shown in Fig. 5 for information.  
 
   
Fig.5. Three test videos: Basketball (left), Scene (middle) and Mobile (right). 
 
As we take four successive frames as a group, there are 20 groups from 80 frames. For the 6400 bits within the watermark signal, 
we embed 640 bits in each image group. As a result, 10 groups of images are needed for the watermark signal, and the watermark 
signal is embedded twice in the 20 groups of frames. In addition, we divide each frame into 8h8 blocks, and embed 640bits 
watermark data into the 160 AC coefficients of middle-frequency selected by using +XDQJ¶Valgorithm [32].  
 
 Raw frames of 
the Video 
sequence 
 
2-D DCT to the 
image plane in x 
and y axis  
 
1-D DCT to the 
image blocks in 
time axis  
 
CS-watermark 
QIM modulation 
Watermarked 
Video  
 
Secret 
embedding 
information 
Noise 
Channel  
 
QIM 
demodulation 
 
BCS applied to 
DCT coefficients  
 
CS-watermark  
   Data  
 
Secret 
information  CS-Matrix key S 
High-quality  
Recovered 
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Fig. 3. A video information hiding experiment system with the CS-watermark signal. 
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B. Evaluation criteria 
In information hiding systems, the transparency and the robustness are usually used for performance assessment [22], and [25]. 
For transparency, we use the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) as a criterion to estimate the invisibility of the embedded watermark 
signal. The PSNR can judge the received image quality by comparing the degree of diversity between the received image and the 
original one. The PSNR, derived from the mean square error (MSE), is defined as follows. 
¦ ¦    
 
h wI
i
I
jwh
jiHjiHIIMSE
MSE
H
PSNR
1 1
2
21
1
max
|),(),(|)(
log20
         (22) 
where 
maxH  is 255 for a gray-level image; ),(1 jiH  and ),(2 jiH  denote the received image and the original image corresponding 
to i and j coordinates in 2D space. 
hI  and wI  denote the height and width of the image, respectively. 
Robustness is also one important metrics for performances measurement in watermarking. In our experiment, the normalized 
correlation (NC) is used for calculating the difference between the extracted watermark signal ),( jiW
*
 at the receiver side and the 
original watermark signal ),( jiW  at the sender side as defined below  
¦ ¦
¦ ¦
  
   
1 2
1 2
1 1
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N
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N
j
N
i
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                  (23) 
where 
1N  and 2N  denote the height and width of the original watermark image (fingerprint), respectively.  
According to the measurement samples in Fig. 4, extracted fingerprint images using the BCS-SPL algorithm [29] are given in 
Fig. 6. As can be seen, the original fingerprint image can be successfully recovered in high quality, though larger sampled image 
produces slightly higher quality image indicated by the obtained PSNR values. To test the robustness of our proposed watermark 
scheme, the size of the watermark signal in our experiment is chosen as M=80h80 or 6400 bits. 
 
(a)   (b)   (c) 
Fig. 6. Recovered fingerprint images with CS watermark signal by BCS-SPL. (a) PSNR=66.32dB (measurement samples of size 80h80), (b) PSNR=69.93dB (80
h100), (c) PSNR=70.18dB (100h100). 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Under the aforementioned experimental settings, the abovementioned three video sequences are used for performance 
measurement and evaluation. The results from our proposed approach have been compared with the methods from Huang [32] and 
Kong [35]. These approaches are selected as they represent two groups of typical algorithms performed in the spatial domain and 
SVD domain, respectively. Various attacks including MPEG and H.264 compression, noise contamination and filtering are used for 
performance assessment. Comprehensive results are reported and discussed as detailed below.  
A. Transparency measurement 
After embedding the fingerprint-based watermark signal into every 40 frames of the video sequence, the PSNR of the resulted 
sequences are calculated to measure the transparency of the proposed CS watermark signal scheme. For each sequence, the PSNR 
values over 80 frames are illustrated in Fig. 7, in benchmarking with Huang [32] and Kong [35].  
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Fig. 7. Comparison of transparency of our watermark scheme and those in [32] and [35] using PSNR of the watermarked videos from the three sequences. 
 
As can be seen, our approach has generated the highest PSNR values, 50-G%DPRQJWKHWKUHH.RQJ¶VDSSURDFK>35], on 
average, produces the worse results in this group of experiments. This has indicated that our method causes very slight distortion to 
the video signal and simultaneously provides high visual quality of the watermarked videos. Thanks to the proposed CS-watermark 
scheme, we only need 25% of samples for embedding as requested in [32] and [35]. This has explained the high transparency of our 
CS-watermark methodology.  
B. Robustness measurement 
The robustness of the proposed CS-watermark scheme has been tested with different attacks, including compression, filtering, 
noise and collusion. Relevant results are reported in detail below.  
i) Compression attack: To evaluate the robustness of the watermark scheme under different compression attacks, MPEG-1, 
MPEG-2 and H.264 codecs are employed. For MPEG-1 and MPEG-2, the bit rate used is within 0.5-5Mbps in 10 levels. For H.264, 
due to it is designed for low bit rate applications, we can only manage have the bit rate changed within 0.5-2Mbps. For the video 
sequences compressed using the three approaches above, the acquired NC values under different bit rates are plotted in Figs. 8-11, 
respectively.  
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Fig. 8. NC-based robustness comparison under different MPEG-1 bit rates. 
 
As can be seen, our approach significantly outperforms the other two in these three figures in terms of high NC values achieved 
and consistency of NC when the bit rate varies. The larger the NC value is, the better the robustness of the information hiding system 
is. This has indicated that the proposed approach is extremely robust to the three commonly used compression attacks. On the 
Zhao and Ren,         Cognitive Computation of Compressed Sensing IRU:DWHUPDUN6LJQDO« 
 
10 
contrary, the two benchmarking approaches have produced much lower NC values, which are inevitably affected by the changing of 
bit rate.  
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Fig.9. NC-based robustness comparison under different MPEG-2 bit rates. 
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Fig.10. NC-based robustness comparison under different H.264 bit rates. 
ii) Filtering attacks: To further assess the robustness of the proposed CS-watermark scheme, we consider also various intentional 
or unintentional attacks, such as 2-D 3×3 Wiener and median filtering. The results are compared in Figs. 11-12 below.  
When Wiener and median filtering are respectively applied to the watermarked video frames, the detected watermark signal is 
affected by the degraded images. As such, the NC values for the two benchmarking approaches have declined to 0.5-0.7. However, 
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our proposed approach can always maintain a high NC value over 0.997. This again has validated the robustness of the proposed 
CS-watermark scheme. 
 
 
        
      
      
Fig.11. Wiener filtering attack results for the Basketball (top), Scene (middle) and Mobile (bottom) videos. In each row, the three images (left-right) are from our 
approach, Huang [32] and Kong [35] with NC values of (1.0, 0.682, 0.573), (0.998, 0.661, 0.552), and (0.997, 0.626, 0.508), respectively. 
 
      
      
      
Fig.12. Median filtering attack results for the Basketball (top), Scene (middle) and Mobile (bottom) videos. In each row, the three images (left-right) are from our 
approach, Huang [32] and Kong [35] with NC values of (0.998, 0.623, 0.503), (0.999, 0.718, 0.559), and (0.997, 0.709, 0.602), respectively. 
iii) Noise attacks: To further validate the robustness of the proposed approach, Gaussian (zero-mean with a variance of 0.05) and 
³SHSSHU	VDOW´QRLVH (with a density of 0.1) are used to attack the watermarked videos. The attached images are shown in Fig. 13 to 
indicate the severity of the noise introduced. The associated results are compared in Figs. 14-15 below. 
When Gaussian and Pepper & Salt noise are respectively applied to the watermarked video frames, the detected watermark signal 
is also affected by the degraded images (see in Fig. 13). As such, the NC values for the two benchmarking approaches have declined 
to 0.6-0.9. However, our proposed approach can always maintain a high NC value no less than 0.999. This again has validated the 
robustness of the proposed CS-watermark scheme. 
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Fig. 13. Noise attached Basketball (top), Scene (middle) and Mobile (bottom) sequences using Gaussian (left) and Pepper & salt (right) noise, respectively. 
 
       
       
      
Fig.14. Result against Gaussian noise attacked videos for Basketball (top), Scene (middle) and mobile (bottom). In each row, the three images (left-right) are from 
our approach, Huang [32] and Kong [35] with NC values of (1.0, 0.732, 0.611), (1.0, 0.750, 0.682), and (1.0, 0.896, 0.702), respectively. 
iii) Collusion attack: Collusion is one of the most common attacks in video information hiding [2], where the hidden watermark 
signal can be removed after it has been successfully identified by the attacker. Here, the robustness of the proposed method against 
this type of attack is assessed.  
First, we embedded only one watermark image into 80 frames in video streams, and an attempt was made to obtain an estimate 
of the watermark by averaging the 80 frames directly. Fig. 16 shows the relevant results, which has indicated that the proposed 
CS-watermark signal cannot be easily estimated than those from Huang [32] and Kong [35]. For the two benchmarking approaches, 
the watermark signal has been removed when the colluded frames reaches 45-68. While for our approach, the watermark signal can 
still survive, with an NC value over 80%, even if all the 80 frames have been colluded. 
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Fig.15. Result against Pepper & salt noise attacked videos for Basketball (top), Scene (middle) and mobile (bottom). In each row, the three images (left-right) are 
from our approach, Huang [30] and Kong [31] with NC values of (1.0, 0.761, 0.655), (1.0, 0.763, 0.631), and (0.999, 0.783, 0.642), respectively. 
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Fig. 16. Comparison results after collusion attack. 
 
The proposed CS-watermark scheme benefits from two key factors, i.e. much less measurement samples required, and 
asymptotically normally distributed samples (ANDS). Usually, attackers may take advantage of the motionless regions in successive 
frames to remove the watermark signal. Although the identical watermark image is used within all frames, ANDS has prevented 
attackers from removing the watermark signal by averaging the frames. In the other words, attackers cannot estimate the 
CS-watermark signal by statistical averaging and remove it from our proposed CS-watermarked video. As a result, the resistance to 
collusion attacks has been significantly enhanced. 
C. The influence of key parameters 
In this part, how the key parameters of the proposed CS-watermark scheme may affect the quality of the resulted images is 
discussed. Under different parameters in terms of payloads, CS watermark sizes and the proportion of changed pixels, the image 
quality is measured using PSNR with results shown in Table I and Table II for comparison. These are results for the three test videos, 
Basketball, Scene and Mobile. 
 
TABLE I  
AVERAGE PSNR (dB) FOR THREE TEST VIDEOS WITH VARYING  
CS-WATERMARK SIZES 
Mw  AND PAYLOADS (EMBED 1 Mw /FRAMES) 
Payloads 
Ratios of 
Mw  
0.25 1 4 9 16 25 
Results for the Basketball Sequence 
20 58.82 55.61 50.06 49.54 47.86 38.95 
40 61.42 56.95 53.58 51.91 49.18 48.92 
60 63.18 58.34 55.09 53.95 52.11 50.08 
80 65.98 63.26 60.62 58.97 56.86 55.81 
Results for the Scene Sequence 
20 57.69 55.12 49.96 49.85 49.72 40.58 
40 61.01 57.86 55.56 51.81 50.82 49.62 
60 62.98 58.42 54.89 53.91 52.97 51.42 
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80 67.75 63.18 60.22 58.16 56.13 55.89 
Results for the Mobile Sequence 
20 58.62 55.42 49.66 48.94 45.69 39.45 
40 62.40 56.44 53.28 51.11 47.19 46.82 
60 64.06 58.02 55.04 53.81 51.97 50.01 
80 66.75 63.15 60.12 58.75 56.11 54.93 
 
TABLE II  
AVERAGE PSNR (dB) FOR THREE TEST VIDEOS WITH VARYING  
CS-WATERMARK SIZES 
Mw  AND PIXEL RATIOS 
Ratio of black 
or changed 
pixels % 
Ratios of 
Mw  
0.25 1 4 9 16 25 
Results for the Basketball Sequence 
0.01 56.29 52.02 50.61 46.28 43.09 38.35 
0.25 61.01 55.12 53.18 50.12 45.17 40.96 
0.5 63.14 56.92 54.81 52.19 49.92 42.76 
0.75 65.25 62.11 58.23 52.66 54.19 44.13 
1.0 67.82 67.72 61.07 52.18 52.59 45.93 
Results for the Scene Sequence 
0.01 55.32 52.82 51.39 47.72 44.13 39.37 
0.25 60.98 55.87 53.91 50.86 46.14 44.93 
0.5 63.94 56.82 54.95 52.87 50.86 50.71 
0.75 65.16 62.91 60.29 57.67 55.49 52.03 
1.0 66.65 65.29 62.87 59.11 56.57 55.82 
Results for the Mobile Sequence 
0.01 58.24 53.92 52.41 46.88 45.44 39.85 
0.25 61.81 55.96 53.98 49.72 44.16 43.86 
0.5 63.85 57.12 54.72 50.28 45.98 44.86 
0.75 65.19 61.92 59.13 53.46 54.13 42.73 
1.0 68.50 66.71 65.04 54.88 53.58 50.96 
 
With the increasing of watermark size, the image quality decreases accordingly as indicated by the achieved PSNR values in 
Tables I-II. For a given CS watermark size, increasing payloads or ratio of changed pixels can generally help to produce higher 
PSNR values, i.e. improved image quality. However, there are exceptional cases for the Mobile sequence in Table II, where 
increased pixel ratios sometimes cannot yield improved PSNR values, especially when the watermark size is larger, say 16 and 25. 
The inconsistency is mainly due to the complicity of the scene.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, based on the neural perception mechanism of our human brains in dealing with multidimensional data, a novel 
cognitive computation based CS-watermark approach is proposed for information hiding inside videos. As the CS-watermark signal 
is generated by measurement values of the scramble block Hadamard matrix, all features of the original watermark image can be 
represented. Accordingly, this naturally possesses an encryption property from random elements of measurement matrix where 
encryption occurs implicitly in the sensing process-without requiring additional computation. As a result, the CS-watermark signal 
is computationally simple, and has higher security than traditional methods achieved by extra scrambling and random processing in 
information hiding field. In addition, as only a small amount of the watermark data needs be embedded into the video, the proposed 
data hiding approach can effectively resist compressions, noise and filtering attacks and still maintain a better performance in terms 
of transparency and robustness. This has shown the great potential of applying CS-based cognitive computation in this emerging 
topic. Future works include combining machine-learning based data hiding analysis approaches such as extreme learning machine 
[38] and sparse representation based measurement matrix reconstruction [39] to further improve the security and robustness of data 
hiding. 
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